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I

Featuref\rt~d~ Evidence Corner

A surprise: Montana's meptal health
provider privileges, o~ lack thereof
the disclosures made by a person seeking mental health services:
Last month's Evidence Corner, about the doctor-patient
privilege, dealt with the protection of communications made by
a patient to obtain physical health care. This month, I discuss
... the question we address today is whether a privilege
the existence and limits of the corollary privilege for mental
protecting confidential communications between a
health practitioners.
psychotherapist and her patient "promotes sufficiently
As with the doctor-patient privilege, Montana's state court
important interests to outweigh the need for probative
privilege is different from the federal version. In both sysevidence .... " ... Both "reason and experience" persuade
tems, communications made for mental health enjoystronger
us that it does.
privilege than doctor-patient communications. Surprisingly,
however, Montana's privilege is far more limited than the federal
psychotherapist privilege. It may be time for a statutory extenLike the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the
sion of the state's mental health privilege; for sure, Montana's
psychotherapist-patient privilege is "rooted in the
social workers should advise their psychotherapy clients that
imperative need for confidence and trust." Ibid.
their sessions are not covered by any evidentiary privilege.
Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can
THE FEDERAL PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE
often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical
examination, objective information supplied by the
Let's be clear: Justice Antonin Scalia doesn't need no stinkin'
patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective
shrink. He apparently gets his counseling from his mother, or
psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an
from his bartender, neither of whom is entitled to any sort of
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient
communications privilege, and that is good enough for him:
is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist
facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the
came to play such an indispensable role in the
sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals
maintenance of the citizenry's mental health? For most
consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential
of history, men and women have worked out their
communications made during counseling sessions may
difficulties by talking to, inter alias, parents, siblings,
cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the
best friends, and bartenders - none of whom was
mere possibility of disclosure may impede development
awarded a privilege against testifying in court.
of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1934, 135
treatment. As the Judicial Conference Advisory
L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996) (Scalia, dissenting).
Committee observed in 1972 when it recommended
Seven other members of the Court outvoted him, however,
that Congress recognize a psychotherapist privilege
and the majority opinion in this case established a federal evias part of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, a
dentiary privilege for communications between a psychotherapsychiatrist's ability to help her patients
pist and a patient, pursuant to FRE SO l's injunction that federal
"'is completely dependent upon [the patients']
privileges are to be determined by the federal courts, rather than
willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes
1
by legislative or rule-making bodies. Justice Stevens, writing for
it difficult if not impossible for [a psychiatrist] to
the Court, articulated the public policy in favor of protection of
function without being able to assure ... patients of
confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.
1 FRE 501, which I have discussed at more length in previous columns about
Where there may be exceptions to this general rule .. .,
other privileges, provides:
there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua
RULE 501. PRIVILEGE IN GENERAL
non for successful psychiatric treatment.' " Advisory
The common law - as interpreted by United States courts in the light
of reason and experience - governs a claim of privilege unless any of
Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D.
the following provides otherwise:
183, 242 (1972) (quoting Group for Advancement
the United States Constitution;
of Psychiatry, Report No. 45, Confidentiality and
a federal statute; or
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Privileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or de92 (June 1960)).
fense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.
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By prote Ling nfidential co~municat~ons between
a psy hothernpist and her patient from mvol.untary
dis losure, Lhe proposed privilege thu s serves important
private interests.
Our cases make clear that an asserted privilege must
also "serv[e] public ends." Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d
584 (1981) .... The psychotherapist privilege serves
the public interest by facilitating the provision of
appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the
effects of a mental or emotional problem. The mental
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health,
is a public good of transcendent importance.
In contrast to the significant public and private interests
supporting recognition of the privilege, the likely
evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of
the privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected,
confidential conversations between psychotherapists
and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly
when it is obvious that the circumstances that give
rise to the need for treatment will probably result in
litigation. Without a privilege, much of the desirable
evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek
access - for example, admissions against interest by a
party - is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken
"evidence" will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking
function than if it had been spoken and privileged.
That it is appropriate for the federal courts to
recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule
501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the
District of Columbia have enacted into law some form
of psychotherapist privilege. (Citations and footnotes
omitted)

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-12, 116 S. Ct. 1923,
1928-29, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996).
Once the Jaffee majority had decided to recognize some form
of psychotherapist privilege, its next task was to define the class
of mental health professionals to whom the privilege would
extend. The defendant-patient in the wrongful death case, Mary
Lu Redmond, was a city police officer who, while on duty, shot
and killed the plaintiffs decedent. After the incident, Officer
Redmond participated in about 50 counseling sessions with a
therapist employed by the city. That therapist was neither a
psychiatrist nor a psychologist, but was a licensed clinical social
worker.
When the plaintiff tried to discover what Officer Redmond
had said to social worker Breyer in their counseling sessions,
both the patient and the therapist objected on grounds of
privilege and refused both to provide the therapist's notes and
to answer oral questions (or claimed that they could not recall
what was said). The trial judge ordered disclosure, and when it
did not come, informed the jury that there was no legal justification for the claim of privilege and that the jury could assume the
information would be unfavorable to Redmond. On appeal, the
7t1i Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that such a privilege
should exist. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve the split
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between the circuits.
The Supreme Court affirmed the existence of the privilege,
with regard not only to psychiatrists and psychologists but also
to licensed clinical social workers:
All agree that a psychotherapist privilege covers
confidential communications made to licensed
psychiatrists 2 and p'sychologists. We have no hesitation
in concluding in this case that the federal privilege
should also extend to confidential communications
made to licensed social workers in the course of
psychotherapy. The reasons for recognizing a privilege
for treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists apply
with equal force to treatment by a clinical social worker
such as Karen Beyer. Today, social workers provide
a significant amount of mental health treatment. See,
e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Center
for Mental Health Services, Mental Health, United
States, 1994, pp. 85-87, 107-114; Brief for National
Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae
5-7 (citing authorities). Their clients often include the
poor and those of modest means who could not afford
the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist, id., at
6-7 (citing authorities), but whose counseling sessions
serve the same public goals. Perhaps in recognition
of these circumstances, the vast majority of States
explicitly extend a testimonial privilege to licensed
social workers.'7 We therefore agree with the Court
of Appeals that "[d]rawing a distinction between the
counseling provided by costly psychotherapists and the
counseling provided by more readily accessible social
workers serves no discernible public purpose."

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-17, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 193132, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996).
As you would expect, Justice Scalia vehemently - and entertainingly - disagreed:
I must observe that the Court makes its task deceptively
simple by the manner in which it proceeds. It begins by
characterizing the issue as "whether it is appropriate for
federal courts to recognize a 'psychotherapist privilege,'
" ante, at 1925, and devotes almost all of its opinion
to that question. Having answered that question (to
its satisfaction) in the affirmative, it then devotes less
than a page of text to answering in the affirmative the
small remaining question whether "the federal privilege
should also extend to confidential communications
made to licensed social workers in the course of
psychotherapy,'' ante, at 1931.

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 20, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1933, 135
L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). Justice Scalia's dissent devotes substantially more room to the difference between psychiatrists and
psychologists on the one hand and social workers on the other,
concluding that if there is going to be some sort of psychotherapist privilege, it should be restricted to the former:
2 Remember that there is no doctor-patient privilege in federal court, so that the
only protection for disclosures to a psychiatrist M.D. is through this psychotherapist privilege. Where the doctor-patient privilege is recognized, a psychiatrist's
sessions should fit under that umbrella. [Ford, not Supreme Court, footnote]
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A licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is an expert
in psychotherapy- and that may suffice (though I
think it not so clear that this Court should make the
judgment) to justify the use of extraordinary means
to encourage counseling with him, as opposed to
counseling with one's rabbi, minister, family, or friends.
One must presume that a social worker does not bring
this greatly heightened degree of skill to bear, which is
alone a reason for not encouraging that consultation as
generously. Does a social worker bring to bear at least
ft significantly heightened degree of skill-more than
a minister or rabbi, for example? I have no idea, and
neither does the Court ....
With due respect, it does not seem to me that any
of this [social work] training is comparable in its
rigor (or indeed in the precision of its subject) to the
training of the other experts (lawyers) to whom this
Court has accorded a privilege, or even of the experts
(psychiatrists and psychologists) to whom the Advisory
Committee and this Court proposed extension of a
privilege in 1972. Of course these are only Illinois'
requirements for "social workers." Those of other
States, for all we know, may be even less demanding.
Indeed, I am not even sure there is a nationally accepted
definition of "social worker," as there is of psychiatrist
and psychologist. It seems to me quite irresponsible to
extend the so-called "psychotherapist privilege" to all
licensed social workers, nationwide, without exploring
these issues.

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 29-30, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1938,
135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996).
Justice Scalia garnered only one vote, so his position went
down 7-2. Jaffee remains the law in federal court, meaning
that in federal criminal and non-state-law civil cases, 3 there is
an absolute privilege for communications by a patient/client to
her psychotherapist, whether she has selected a psychiatrist4,
psychologist, or licenseds social worker to fill that role.

MONTANA: PSYCHOLOGISTS ONLY?
As you will recall from earlier columns, Montana takes
the opposite approach to creation of privilege. In our state,
evidentiary privileges are restricted to those identified by the
Legislature in Title 26 of the Montana Code Annotated. M.C.A.
26-1-807 6 provides such a privilege for some, but not all, mental
health professionals:
26-1-807. Psychologist-client privilege. The
confidential relations and communications between a
psychologist and a client must be placed on the same
3 See last month's column, expanding on the discussion of the last sentence of
FRE 501: "But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision:'
4 There is no doctor-patient privilege in federal court (see last month), so psychiatrists have to be covered by the psychotherapist privilege or not at all.
5 Justice Scalia observes a difference between "licensed social worker" and "licensed clinical social worker;' but the majority opinion specifically uses the less
restrictive phrase.
6 This statute was enacted in 1971, and its only amendment was in 2009, as part
of a gender-neutralizing rewrite of a number of statutes.
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basis as provided by law for those between an attorney
and a client. Nothing in any act of the Legislature may
be construed to require the privileged communications
to be disclosed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Montana is included in Justice Stevens' list of"all 50
States and the District of~olumbia [which] have enacted into
law some form of the psychotherapist privilege." Jaffee, 518 U.S.
at 12. The Court then includes Montana in its list of states that
extend that privilege to social workers, but (shockingly?) the
M.C.A. doirs not support that proposition, as I explain below.
A. Psychologists are definitely protected by Montana
statute

M.C.A. 26-1-807, in both its title and text, is limited to
psychologists. The statute itself does not define "psychologist"
but M.C.A. Title 37, "Professions and Occupations," Chapter 17,
"Psychologists," states:
(4) (a) "Practice of psychology" means the observation,
description, interpretation, and modification of human
behavior by the application of psychological principles,
methods, and procedures for the purpose of eliminating
symptomatic, maladaptive, or undesired behavior
and improving interpersonal relations, work and life
adjustment, personal effectiveness, and mental health.
(b) The practice of psychology includes but is not
limited to psychological testing and evaluation
or assessment of personal characteristics such as
intelligence, personality, abilities, interests, aptitudes,
and neuropsychological functioning; counseling,
psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, hypnosis, biofeedback,
and behavior analysis and therapy; diagnosis and
treatment of mental and emotional disorders or
disabilities, chemical dependency, substance abuse, and
the psychological aspects of physical illness, accident,
injury, or disability; and psychoeducational evaluation,
therapy, remediation, and consultation.
(5) A person represents to the public that the person
is a "psychologist" when the person uses a title or
description of services incorporating the words
"psychologist," "psychological," "psychologic,"
or "psychology" and offers to render or renders
psychological services described in subsection (4)
to individuals, groups, corporations, or the public,
whether or not the person does so for compensation or
fee.
M.C.A. 37-17-101. M.C.A. 37-17-301 requires psychologists
to be licensed; 37-17-302 sets forth the requirements for licensure, which include a doctoral degree in psychology, an examination, and a minimum of two years of supervised experience in
the practice of psychology.
Thus, a person who is a licensed psychologist in the state of
Montana can guarantee to his clients that their communications
are both subject to a duty of confidentiality7 and privileged from
disclosure by M.C.A. 26-1-807. The Montana Supreme Court
7 This ethical duty is expressed in APA Ethical Standard 4.05, Disclosures.
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recognized this privilege and applied it to a sex abuse victim's
psychological records in State v. Duffy, 300 Mont. 381, 6 P.3d
453 (2000). 8 In State v. Reynolds, the rape defendant sought
inspection of the victim's mental health records, including those
from her psychiatrist and psychologist. The Court ruled:
We further hold that the medical records pertaining to
the victim's psychotherapeutic treatment are protected
from disclosure by various recognized testimonial
privileges which outweigh the defendant's purported
need for or limited right to such information in the
hands of a non-adversary third party. Section 26-1-807,
MCA, provides an unqualified privilege for confidential
communications between a psychologist and client. The
District Court acted properly in denying defendant's
motion to obtain access to Dr. Sievert's, Sandi Burns'
and Dr. Newman's records pertaining to Janey Doe.
State v. Reynolds, 243 Mont. 1, 8, 792 P .2d 1111, 1115 ( 1990).
More recently, in a non-citable 2009 opinion, the Court affirmed
the denial of defendant's request for the mental health records
of a non-victim witness for the State, citing both the patient's
constitutional and statutory rights to privacy as well as M.C.A.
26-1-807. State v. Miller, 352 Mont. 553, 218 P.3d 500, 2009 MT
314N.
8 This case does recognize the competing right of a criminal defendant to discovery of exculpatory information, and assigned to the trial judge the duty of in camera inspection of the records to ensure that only those which truly are exculpatory
are turned over to the defense. Thus, Q..yfu does provide a way around the privilege in some criminal cases, despite the absolute language of the privilege statute.
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Note that in ord er lo obtain th e pr te tion M.C. A. 261-807, I here must b a psycho] gist- lient r ationsbip. Wh n
the psy hoJogisl is employ d by th ·opp nenl, this relati nship
and thu · ti i privil g do not exist, although the party may have
other protections. Thomas Park was charged with homicide and
forgery, and indicated that he intended to call mental health care
providers at trial to support his affirmative defense of extreme
mental or emotional stress. The State then sought to have its
own expert examine Park for rebuttal purposes, pursuant to
M.C.A. 46-14-212. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
order for such an examination, but laid out restrictions on such
an examination and resulting testimony. Neither the Court nor
the defendant made any reference to the psychologist privilege,
relying instead on the defendant's constitutional rights against
self-incrimination:
'" 35 First and foremost, we recognize that if a
defendant>s privilege not to incriminate himself is to
have any force, it must mean that he can decide with
whom and in what terms he discusses such potentially
incriminating matters as the events surrounding the
charges against him. Further, a defendant's right
to remain silent applies at all stages of a criminal
proceeding ... .Therefore, a defendant clearly carries the
privilege with him into a psychological examination
with the State's expert. . ..
The mere fact that a defendant wishes to introduce
Evidence, page 27

Page 11

Evidence, from page 11

psychological testimony and therefore must cooperate
during an examination so that the State has the
opportunity to rebut his expert testimony is insufficient
to constitute a complete waiver of his right to remain
silent. Accordingly, we conclude that a defendant has
a constitutional right to remain silent when asked
by the State's psychological expert about the events
surrounding the alleged offense.
37 It does not follow, however, that a defendant's right
to remain silent when questioned by the State's expert
about the alleged offense should afford an opportunity
to place unrebuttable testimony before the jury ....
We reverse that part of the District Court's order
that compels Park to answer questions during the
examination regarding the alleged offense, but hold
that ifhe refuses to answer those inquiries by the State's
expert, and also remains silent at trial, he may not offer
that evidence through his expert.

Park v. Montana Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Park Cnty., 1998
MT 164, 289 Mont. 367, 376-378, 961P.2d1267, 1272-74. See
also, State v. Van Dyken, 242 Mont. 415, 791P.2d1350 (1990).
The privilege prevents testimony and documentary evidence
about the psychologist-client relationship from being admitted
at trial. However, like other statutory privileges, it does not apply to sentencing proceedings:
~ 31 We have previously stated that "the rules of
evidence are not applicable or controlling in sentencing
hearings." State v. Race (1997), 285 Mont. 177, 180, 946
P.2d 641, 643 (citation omitted). A sentencing court
is allowed "to have the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics, so
that the court is able to individualize punishment."
Race, 285 Mont. at 180, 946 P.2d at 643. Thus, a
statement that is covered by the psychotherapistpatient privilege may be inadmissible at trial but is
admissible at a sentencing hearing. Race, 285 Mont. at
180-81, 946 P.2d at 643. (Emphasis supplied)

State v. J.C., 2004 MT 75, 320 Mont. 411, 419, 87 P.3d 501,
507.
The psychologist privilege applies in trial cases in Montana
state courts, both criminal and civil. Furthermore, because
psychologists are included in the psychotherapist privilege in
federal court established by Jaffee, the psychologist's privilege
does not depend on the court system. Therefore, the psychologists' privilege is broader than Montana's doctor-patient
privilege in both respects. I would have no compunction about
revealing the most difficult information (so long as it does not
involve a potential future harm) to a psychologist, confident in
its immunity from forced disclosure. 9
9 The same caveat about waiver of this privilege in civil cases pursuant to
M.R.Civ.P. 35 applies as to waiver of the doctor-patient privilege. See last month's
column on doctor-patient privilege.

www .montanabar.org

B. Psychiatrists are covered by the doctor-patient statute
Psychiatrists are not psychologists, and so are not covered by
Montana's psychologist privilege, if that statute is strictly construed. What is the difference? I turned to that trusty source,
W ebMD, for an explanation:
What's the difference between a psychologist and a
psychiatrist?
·
That may sound like a setup for a knee-slapper, but it's
actually a good question, and many people don't know
the full answer. It's not as simple as who tends to what,
like the difference between a goatherd and shepherd.
Both kinds of professionals treat people with problems
that vary widely by degree and type, from mild anxiety
to schizophrenia. Both can practice psychotherapy, and
both can do research.
The short answer is, psychiatrists are medical doctors
and psychologists are not. The suffix "-iatry" means
"medical treatment," and "-logy" means "science" or
"theory." So psychiatry is the medical treatment of the
psyche, and psychology is the science of the psyche. 10
Because they are doctors, Montana's psychiatrists are covered under the doctor-patient privilege statute, although as we
saw last month, that privilege applies only in civil cases. Thus, a
criminal defendant who consults a psychiatrist for mental health
treatment has no valid privilege to prevent disclosure of what he
said to his psychiatrist, whereas communications to a psychologist are clearly privileged in both civil and criminal cases. This
seems be counter-intuitive: seeking mental health treatment
from an M.D. yields less privilege than using a psychologist, but
that is the current status of Montana law. In federal court, under Jaffee, psychologists and psychiatrists are treated identically.
C. Social workers are NOT covered by privilege, although
they have a statutory duty of confidentiality
What about licensed social workers who provide mental
health services? Again, in federal court under Jaffee, as much
as Justice Scalia may dislike it, these mental health professionals
have the same privilege as psychiatrists and psychologists.
In Montana, the statutory answer is that social workers are
not "psychologists" so the privilege extended by MCA 26-1-807
does not cover them, nor does any other statute in the privilege
section of the Montana Code Annotated, Title 26 Chapter 1.
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court included Montana
in its list of states that "explicitly extend" a privilege for disclosures to licensed social workers, citing M.C.A. 37-22-401.
11
That statute is located in Title 37, entitled "Professions and
Occupation," Chapter 22 of which deals with "Social Work."
Part 4 deals with regulations for social workers. The specific
statute provides:
37-22-401. Privileged communications - exceptions
A licensee may not disclose any information the
licensee acquires from clients consulting the licensee in
a professional capacity except:

1O http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/features/psychology-vs-psychiatrywhich-is-better, last accessed 9/4/2014.
11 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. at 17, fn. 17.
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For instance:
Evidence, from previous page

(1) with the written consent of the client or, in the
case of the client's death or mental incapacity, with the
written consent of the client's personal representative or
guardian;
(2) that the licensee need not treat as confidential a
communication otherwise confidential that reveals the
contemplation of a crime by the client or any other
person or that in the licensee's professional opinion
reveals a threat of imminent harm to the client or others;
(3) that if the client is a minor and information acquired
by the licensee indicates that the client was the victim of
a crime, the licensee may be required to testify fully in
relation to the information in any investigation, trial, or
other legal proceeding in which the commission of that
crime is the subject of inquiry;
(4) that if the client or the client's personal
representative or guardian brings an action against a
licensee for a claim arising out of the social workerclient relationship, the client is considered to have
waived any privilege;
(5) to the extent that the privilege is otherwise waived by
the client; and
(6) as may otherwise be required by law. (Emphasis
supplied)

This statute has not been substantively changed since its
enactment in 1983, and there are no Montana cases construing
or applying it. In fact, W estlaw research revealed only two cases
nationwide citing this statute, Jaffee being one. 12
With all due respect, I think that Justice Stevens over-relied
(or under-analyzed) Montana state law in support of his conclusion that licensed clinical social workers were entitled to share
in the psychotherapist privilege. The Montana Supreme Court
is the final arbiter of evidence law in our state courts, and it
is bound by the plain language of the statutes enacted by the
Montana Legislature. The Legislature clearly limits privileged
relationships to those specified in Title 26, Chapter 1:
26-1-801. Policy to protect confidentiality in certain
relations. There are particular relations in which it
is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and
to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be
examined as a witness in the cases enumerated in this
part. (Emphasis added)

Psychologists are enumerated in this part; social workers,
licensed or not, are not.
The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the
legislative intent to limit privileges to those specified by statute.
12 The other is from a federal court in the Southern District of Alabama in 2002,
which analyzed the list provided in Jaffee to divide states on that list into those
which do and do not require licensure of the social worker for recognition of the
privilege. Jane Student 1 v. Williams. 206 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Ala., 2002) (concluding
that that the federal psychotherapist privilege does not extend to unlicensed social workers or unlicensed professional counselors).
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16 Initially, we observe that testimonial privileges
must be strictly construed because they contravene
the fundamental principle that the public has the right
to everyone's evidence. See MacKinnon, "21 (citing
Trammel v. Unit~d States (1980), 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100
S.ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186, 195).

State v. Gooding, 1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 238, 989
P.2d 304, 307. "While serving these underlying policy goals, the
[attol'ney-client] privilege must be construed narrowly because
it obstructs the truth-finding process." Am._Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Montana Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 2012 MT 61, 364 Mont.
299, 303, 280 P.3d 240, 245. Justice Warner, joined by Justice
Rice, observed in another context (venue) "it is not for this Court
to add to what has been omitted to a statute." Maupin v. Meadow
Park Manor, 2005 MT 304, 329 Mont. 413, 416, 125 P.3d 611,
614.
It is true that the words "privilege" and "social worker" do
appear together in a statute, but that statute is not located in Title
26 Chapter 1, Part 8, and so is not "enumerated in this part" as
required by M.C.A. 26-1-801. Moreover, the exception to the
"privilege" in M.C.A. 37-22-401, stated as subpart 6, specifically
requires a social worker to disclose confidential information "as
may otherwise be required by law." A judge requiring disclosure
of the communications in a court proceeding (through discovery
or at trial), would certainly be "required by law." My best reading
of the social worker statute is that it sets forth a statutory duty of
confidentiality, but does not create an evidentiary privilege.
There is one Montana Supreme Court case that implicitly
affirms disclosure of a social worker's records while protecting
those of a psychiatrist and psychotherapist, without any reference at all to M.C.A. 37-22-401, although it had been enacted
seven years earlier. In State v. Reynolds, supra, the young adopted
daughter who was allegedly raped by her father, spent some time
at a mental health facility in Billings after she was removed from
the home. There, she was treated by a team of mental health care
providers, including a psychiatrist, a psychotherapist13, and a social worker (Rochelle Beley). The defendant wanted access to all
these records, but as discussed above, the trial court and Supreme
Court both held that the psychiatrist and psychotherapist records
were privileged:
We further hold that the medical records pertaining to
the victim's psychotherapeutic treatment are protected
from disclosure by various recognized testimonial
privileges which outweigh the defendant's purported
need for or limited right to such information in the
hands of a non-adversary third party. Section 26-1-807,
MCA, provides an unqualified privilege for confidential
communications between a psychologist and client. The
District Court acted properly in denying defendant's
motion to obtain access to Dr. Sievert's, Sandi Burns'
and Dr. Newman's records pertaining to Janey Doe.
13 The case never defines the exact qualifications of this "psychotherapist" and it
is not clear if in fact the patient or the prosecutor asserted the psychologist privilege: "The prosecutor also agreed to ask psychotherapist Sandi Burns to bring her
records for a similar in camera inspection, but defense counsel made no further
request for inspection:' 243 Mont. at 7.
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tate v. Reynolds, 243 Mont. 1, 8, 792 P.2d 1111, 11 l S (1990)
Howeve~, with ut any critical comment, the Court also ob erved
that the Judge had allowed ·the defense to access to th soda!
worker's records:
The files of Rochelle Beley, including any reports therein
from Rivendell and Billings Deacones Hospital" 2North .Psychiatric Unit, w re subjected to an in camera
inspection by defense counsel.

, r ts do not have any privilege for their
a step. Social workers c ien
'f the clients or their providers
. .
I do not know 1
commumcatlons.
h ch is that b th side a . 't ation but my un
are aware of th 1s s1 u
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.
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243 Mont. at 7, 792 P.2d at lll5 (1990). Presumably, no one
. t 1s
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. ti'ons between a clJ.ent an
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in the case made any claim to privilege for a social worker, and
. 1worker sh ould b e kep t confidential by the
soc1a
. social worker. per
the Court certainly did not blink at the disclosure of her records.
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are
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.
th
profession
th e st at ut es regu latmg e
'
di be subJect
d ·
Reynolds' conviction was affirmed.
to disclosure in both civil and criminal court procee ngs esp1te
The primary reason that the U.S. Supreme Court extended
an objection of "privilege."
the privilege to licensed social workers in Jaffee was the Court's
The Legislature should clarify the status of the ment.al health
reasoning that the many Americans receive their mental health
privilege, and if it concludes that social workers are entitle~ ~o
treatment from the most numerous, and least expensive, provid- a privilege, expand M.C.A. 26-1-807 to include li~en~ed chmcal
ers: social workers. Justice Scalia's dissent questioned the truth of social workers as well as psychologists and p~yc~1atnsts. In the
this proposition, and argued that such a decision was better left
meantime, Montanans who wish to keep their disclosures to a
to the legislative branch. In Montana, where privileges are purely mental health practitioner privileged should go to psychologists,
statutory, the Legislature has not yet been convinced to take such and not to either psychiatrists or social workers.

McGrath, from page 19

University Law School, he served as a Reginald Heber Smith
Community Lawyer Fellow in Reno, Nevada, providing legal
services to low-income clients.
And as chief justice, Krueger said, McGrath has fought to
promote and establish self-help centers throughout Montana,

.

and he has made continued funding of self-help centers and
pro bono services among his top priorities.
"ChiefJustice Mike McGrath deserves to be recognized for
improving access to the judicial system and a distinguished
legal career that has demonstrated not only a personal commitment and dedication, but also excellence in the development of
practices to expand and impact the delivery oflegal services to
the unrepresented Montana population," Krueger said.

VISIT OUR NEW WEBSITE
LOG ONTO

WWW.MONTANABAR.ORG
TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF YOUR
STATE BAR MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS
The State Bar of Montana launched a brand-new version of its website
in June. If you haven't yet logged on to the new site,
you will need to create a password to take advantage
of many of the services available to our members,
·ch Iaunc hed as a new. benefit
.including
. Fastcase legal research, w h1
.
' Members in ear 1y July.
to Active Attorney Members and Paralega 15ect ion
.
.
· ht part of the home page
Click on "Forgot your password?" m the upper rig
and enter your username or email address.
6 442 -7660 ·
If you have trouble logging in,contact the State Bar at 40 -

www.montanabar.org

Page 29

